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Growth mindset in the classroom pdf

Abstract: Recent work has shown that architectural isolation can be violated through software side channel attacks that exploit microarchitectural performance optimizations such as speculation to leak secrets. While turning off microarchitectural optimizations can preclude some classes of attacks, we argue that performance and security do not have be in conflict, provided processors are designed with security in mind.

We espouse a principled approach to eliminating entire attack surfaces through microarchitectural isolation, rather than plugging attack-specific privacy leaks. We argue that minimal modifications to hardware can defend against all currently-practical side channel attacks and without significant performance impact. As an application of this approach, we describe the Sanctum processor architecture that offers strong provable isolation of software modules running concurrently and sharing resources, and Sanctoom, a speculative, out-of-order variant with similar properties.

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These processors provide isolation even when large parts of the operating system are compromised, and their open-source implementations allow security properties to be independently verified. His current research interests are in computer security, computer architecture and applied cryptography. Desoer Technical Achievement award for his research in secure hardware.

Srini Devadas Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Title: Secure High-Performance Computer Architectures: Challenges and Opportunities Abstract: Recent work has shown that architectural isolation can be violated through software side channel attacks that exploit microarchitectural performance optimizations such as speculation to leak secrets.

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